§1. The origins of recursion theory. In dedicating a book to Steve Kleene, I referred to him as the person who made recursion theory into a theory. Recursion theory was begun by Kleene's teacher at Princeton, Alonzo Church, who first defined the class of recursive functions; first maintained that this class was the class of computable functions (a claim which has come to be known as Church's Thesis); and first used this fact to solve negatively some classical problems on the existence of algorithms. However, it was Kleene who, in his thesis and in his subsequent attempts to convince himself of Church's Thesis, developed a general theory of the behavior of the recursive functions. He continued to develop this theory and extend it to new situations throughout his mathematical career. Indeed, all of the research which he did had a close relationship to recursive functions.
Church's Thesis arose in an accidental way. In his investigations of a system of logic which he had invented, Church became interested in a class of functions which he called the -definable functions. Initially, Church knew that the successor function and the addition function were -definable, but not much else. During 1932, Kleene gradually showed 1 that this class of functions was quite extensive; and these results became an important part of his thesis 1935a (completed in June of 1933).
It was almost immediate from the definition that every -definable function was computable, i.e., that for each such function there was an algorithm by which, given an argument to the function, we could compute the corresponding value. As Kleene's investigations continued, Church came to believe that all computable functions were -definable. Kleene himself was doubtful; at first he tried to disprove it by a use of the diagonal method.
In 1934, Gödel, already the world's most famous logician, came to the Institute for Advanced Study. Church proposed his thesis to Gödel, who was very skeptical. A little later, Gödel defined another class of functions, each of which was clearly computable; but he was by no means convinced at the time that all computable functions were in this class. Eventually, Church and Kleene 1936b proved that Gödel's class was identical to the class of -definable functions; the members of this class came to be known as the recursive functions.
Kleene was finally convinced of Church's Thesis when he discovered the Recursion Theorem (discussed below). About this time, Alan Turing, unaware of the work being done at Princeton, had defined a class of functions which he claimed was the class of computable functions. In his definition, the class of functions was the class of all functions which could be computed by a particular kind of computing machine. He gave arguments that his machines could compute any computable function; these arguments were very convincing to Gödel and others. Eventually Turing read of Church's work and came to Princeton; while there, he published a proof [13] that his class of functions was equal to the class of recursive functions. From this point, Church's Thesis was accepted by almost all logicians.
One result of all this was the virtual disappearance of -definability from recursion theory. Kleene found, as he had remarked, that -definability did not have much sex appeal for logicians; so he switched to a variant of Gödel's definition. More recently, -definability has been revived and studied by computer scientists. A good introduction to the modern theory of -definability is [3] .
Church realized at an early stage that his thesis made it possible to prove mathematically that finding algorithms to solve certain problems was impossible. He combined this idea and techniques used by Gödel in proving the Incompleteness Theorem 2 to show that there was no algorithm for deciding, given a sentence of the predicate calculus, if it was a theorem. A bit later, Turing showed that there was no algorithm for deciding, given an input for his machine, if the machine would eventually stop if started with this input. Since then, many difficult and interesting results on the nonexistence of algorithms, such as the unsolvability of Hilbert's tenth problem and of the word problem for groups, have been proved; and these results are one of the most important justifications of recursion theory. §2. Basic recursion theory. Kleene began the development of basic recursion theory in 1936a, and extended and improved it in 1952b. We are going to sketch the principal features of this development. From now on, everything we do is attributable to Kleene unless otherwise indicated.
First we consider which functions to allow. Our functions will take natural numbers (i.e., nonnegative integers) as arguments and values. They can be n-ary for any n. An n-ary function need not include among its arguments all n-tuples of numbers; if it does, it is called a total function. (In classical recursion theory, including all of Kleene's work, function means total function and what we have called a function is called a partial function. Partial functions were not even used in recursion theory until Kleene introduced them in 1938. However, they have replaced total functions in most of recursion theory, which explains our change of terminology.) A total unary function is called a real. (This terminology from set theory is not yet popular in recursion theory, but it should be.)
We also want to consider relations; specifically, n-ary relations between natural numbers. (Thus a unary relation is just a set of numbers.) In recursion theory, it is convenient to identify a relation R with its representing function, which is the total function F defined by F (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 if R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and F (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 1 otherwise. We shall understand number to mean natural number and set to mean set of numbers. (Other sets will be referred to as classes.) We use x, y, and z for numbers; F, G, and H for functions; P, Q, and R for relations; and A, B, and C for sets.
Next we need a definition of recursive. We have already mentioned three definitions, due to Church, Gödel, and Turing; we shall use a fourth, due to Kleene. We first list some simple properties which we want the class of recursive functions to have. We shall write x for x 1 , . . . , x n when it is not important to indicate n. We say a class of functions A is recursively closed if I-V are true when 'is recursive' is replaced by 'is in A'. A recursive function is a function which belongs to every recursively closed class. Since the intersection of any number of recursively closed classes is recursively closed, the class of recursive functions is the smallest recursively closed class; so I-V are correct as written.
A function F is computable if there is an algorithm which, if applied to the inputs x, will give the output F ( x) if F ( x) is defined and will give no output otherwise. It is easy to see that the class of computable functions is recursively closed; so every recursive function is computable. The converse is by no means evident; in fact, there is no reason to believe it at this stage of the development.
From I-V we can prove that many functions and relations are recursive, e.g., all constant total functions, the functions + and ·, and the relations =, <, >, ≤ and ≥. We can also prove results of the same nature as I-V, of which we mention two. 5 VI. If P and Q are recursive relations, then ¬P, P ∨ Q, P & Q, P → Q, P ↔ Q, P 1 , and P 2 are recursive, where P 1 and P 2 are defined by
. . , G k are recursive and total, and F is defined by
These consequences are fairly easy to prove; we note only that the P 1 and P 2 in VI should be defined by induction on z.
How shall we treat functions whose arguments and values are objects other than numbers? One method (first introduced by Gödel in his proof of the Incompleteness Theorem) is coding. To each of these objects we assign a number, called the code of that object, in such a way that different objects have different codes. If we have a function with these objects as arguments or values, we replace each such argument or value by its code. (The term 'code' was not used by Kleene, but it has become standard in recent years.)
Here is an important example of coding. Let the objects be all finite sequences of natural numbers. Let p 0 , p 1 , . . . be the primes in increasing order. Then the code of the sequence
, which we designate by x 1 , . . . , x n . A useful property of this coding is that x i < x 1 , . . . , x n ; we call this the sequence code inequality. 5 The fact that these results could be derived from I-V (or even I-IV) was noted by Gödel in his proof of the Incompleteness Theorem.
In this and other codings, the exact choice of codes is not important. What is important is that certain functions and relations associated with the coding are recursive. For example, x 1 , . . . , x n is a recursive function of x 1 , . . . , x n . The set of codes of sequences is recursive. There are recursive total functions lh and (x) i such that if x = x 0 , . . . , x n−1 , then lh(x) = n and (x) i = x i for i < n. Note that the statement that every member of the sequence with code x satisfies P can be written as (∀i < lh(x))P((x) i ).
One of the uses of codes of sequences is to replace n-ary functions by unary functions. If F is n-ary, we define the contraction F of F by
These equations show that F is recursive iff F is recursive.
Another use of codes of sequences is to give an extension of IV. In a definition under IV, the value of F (y, x) depends on the value of F (y − 1, x). In a more general form of definition by induction (sometimes called definition by course-of-values induction), the value of F (y, x) depends on the value of F (z, x) for all z < y. To code these values by a single number, we define F (y, x) = F (0, x), . . . , F (y −1, x) . Then a definition by course-ofvalues induction has the form F (y, x) = G(F (y, x), y, x). We want to show that if G is recursive, then F is recursive. Since F (y, x) = (F (Sc(y), x)) y , it is enough to prove that F is recursive. But it is easy to see that F has an inductive definition which comes under IV.
We now assign numbers, called indices, to recursive functions. We assign the index 1, 0 to Z, 1, 1 to S, and 1, 2 to I . If F and G are as in II and g is an index of G, then 2, g, n, i 1 , . . . , i p is an index of F . If F, G, H are as in III and g, h are indices of G, H , then 3, g, h is an index of F . If F, G, H are as in IV and g, h are indices of G, H , then 4, g, h is an index of F . If F, G are as in V and g is an index of G, then 5, g is an index of F . Clearly no number is an index of two recursive functions, and every recursive function has at least one index. It is easy to prove that the set of indices is recursive by giving a definition by course-of-values induction, using the sequence code inequality.
We let {f}(x 1 , . . . , x n ) be F (x 1 , . . . , x n ) where f is an index of F ; if f is not the index of an n-ary function, then {f}(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is undefined. By a formula, we mean an equation of the form {f}(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = y where f, x 1 , . . . , x n , y are particular numbers and f is the code of an n-ary function. The code of this formula is f, x 1 , . . . , x n , y . The set of codes of formulas is recursive.
We shall show that the true formulas are the theorems of a formal system. The axioms of the formal system are the true formulas {f}( x) = y where f is the code of a function in I. There are four rules of inference, one for each of II-V; we give the last two and leave the other two to the reader. The rule corresponding to IV says: { 4, g, h }(0, x) = z is inferable from {g}( x) = z, and { 4, g, h }(y + 1, x) = z is inferable from { 4, g, h }(y, x) = v and {h}(v, y, x) = z. The rule corresponding to V says: { 5, g }( x) = z is inferable from {g}(z, x) = 0 and {g}(y, x) = v y for all y < z, provided that each v y = 0. As usual, a proof is a nonempty finite sequence of formulas, each of which is inferable from earlier formulas in the sequence (where an axiom is said to be inferable from the empty set); and a theorem is a formula which is the last formula in some proof.
Since formulas inferable from true formulas are true, every theorem is true. It is easy to prove that every true formula {f}( x) = y is a theorem by induction on f, using the sequence code inequality.
The code of a proof is the code of the sequence consisting of the codes of the formulas in the proof. The set of codes of proofs is recursive. The proof of this requires writing out all the rules of inference; it is tedious but straightforward.
We let T n (f, x 1 , . . . , x n , y) mean that y is the code of a proof, and that the last formula of the proof has {f}(x 1 , . . . , x n ) as its left side; this is the famous Kleene T -predicate. Each T n is recursive. It is easy to define a recursive real U such that if y is the code of a proof, then U (y) is the number which appears on the right side of the last formula in the proof. We then have
This important equality is called the Normal Form Theorem.
If F is (n + 1)-ary, we define F (y) by F (y) ( x) = F (y, x). We say that F enumerates a class of functions if that class has F (0) , F (1) 
To prove this, define a recursive function H by H (y, x) = G(S(y, y), x), and let h be an index of H . Let F = H (h) and f = S(h, h). Then F is recursive; f is an index of F ; and
The Recursion Theorem has many uses in recursion theory. We shall show how it can be used to prove that certain functions are recursive. If G and H are total, then F (0, x) = G(x), F (y + 1, x) = H (F (y, 2x), y, x) is a legitimate definition of F (y, x) by induction on y; but it does not come under IV. We want to show that if G and H are recursive, then F is recursive.
By VII and the Enumeration Theorem, K is recursive. Hence there is a recursive F ′ with an index f such that
satisfies the equations for F ; so F ′ = F and hence F is recursive. Now let us sketch how we prove that our definition of recursive is equivalent to other definitions. Suppose A is the class of functions given by the alternative definition. First we prove that A is recursively closed. Then every recursive function is in A. Now let F be in A. Generally, the alternative definition will provide a method of computing F ( x). After suitably coding the objects occurring in the computation, we can show by the above methods that the output of the computation is a recursive function of the inputs. But this means that F is recursive.
What kind of evidence does the theory give for Church's Thesis? We can hope that, given an algorithm for computing F , we can prove that F is recursive by the above methods. Many experiments with particular algorithms have confirmed this. We have already observed that Turing's definition of recursiveness is itself evidence for Church's Thesis. Possibly the best evidence is how well Church's Thesis fits in with the theory. If we replace recursive by computable in results in recursion theory, we often obtain a statement which is evident, or at least more evident than the original result. 6 We conclude this section with a sample proof of nonexistence of an algorithm. First, we define a real F which is not recursive. We do this by the diagonal method; that is, we make F differ from the recursive function {f} at f. Thus we define F (f) = {f}(f) + 1 if {f}(f) is defined and F (f) = 0 otherwise. It follows that the set of f such that {f}(f) is defined is not recursive; for otherwise, the Enumeration Theorem and VII would show that this F is recursive. Hence if G is the recursive function defined by We shall show that if in the prefix two adjacent quantifiers are of the same kind (i.e., both ∃ or both ∀), then they may be replaced by a single such quantifier. Suppose, for example, the definition is R(x) ↔ ∃w∃y∀zP(w, y, z, x). As u varies through all numbers, (u) 0 , (u) 1 varies through all pairs w, y of numbers. Hence we may rewrite our definition as R(x) ↔ ∃u ∀z P((u) 0 , (u) 1 , z, x) . Of course, the matrix has changed; but it is still recursive (since (u) i is a recursive function of u and i).
It follows that every arithmetical relation has a definition in which the prefix does not have two successive quantifiers of the same kind. Then if the prefix has k quantifiers and begins with ∃, the relation is Σ Using the rules for obtaining prenex forms in logic, we obtain closure properties of these relations similar to those given by VI. Thus if P and Q are Σ 0 k , then so are P ∨ Q and P & Q, and the P 1 and P 2 of VI; and ¬P is Π 0 k . If P 3 ( x) ↔ ∃yP(y, x) and P 4 ( x) ↔ ∀yP(y, x), then P 3 is Σ 0 k and P 4 is Π 0 k+1 . All of the results also hold with Π and Σ (and ∀ and ∃) interchanged. These results generally enable us to find the classification of any arithmetical relation we have defined.
The domain of an n-ary function is a class of n-tuples of numbers, i.e., an n-ary relation. We say that a relation is recursively enumerable (abbreviated RE) if it is the domain of a recursive function. We say that a relation R is semicomputable if there is an algorithm which, applied to x, gives an output iff R( x). It is easy to show from Church's Thesis that a relation is RE if it is semicomputable. For this and other reasons, RE relations are of special interest in Recursion Theory. 7 A relation is Σ 0 1 iff it is RE. For if P( x) ↔ ∃yR(y, x) with R recursive, then P is the domain of the recursive function yR(y, x); while if P is the domain of the recursive function with index f, then P( x) ↔ ∃yT n (f, x, y) by the Normal Form Theorem. From this, we can prove that many relations are RE. For example, the set of codes of true formulas is RE; for x is such a code iff there exists a y such that y is the code of a proof and x is the last number in the sequence with code y.
We write W f for the domain of {f}, and say that f is an RE-index of W f . Thus every RE relation has at least one RE-index. By the Normal Form Theorem, Q recursive. Then
so R is recursive.
To get a similar result for ∆ 0 k+1 , we need the concept of relative recursiveness, which was invented by Turing and has played a large role since. Let Φ be a class of total functions. A function is recursive in Φ or relative to Φ if it belongs to every recursively closed class which includes Φ. Almost all of recursion theory remains valid when recursive is replaced by recursive in Φ. (In some cases, we must restrict ourselves to finite Φ. This is not a serious difficulty, since it is easy to see that a function is recursive in Φ iff it is recursive in a finite subset of Φ.)
As an example, we can define arithmetical in Φ, Σ 0 k in Φ, etc., and prove all of the above results for these concepts (although the Enumeration Theorem requires that Φ be finite). We also have a new result: a relation is Σ
The converse requires writing down a definition of P and then using the above ideas to show that P is Σ 0 k+1 . By applying this result to both R and ¬R, we see that R is ∆ 
When Kleene was about to publish this result, he discovered an abstract by Emil Post containing the same result. He immediately gave it the name Post's Theorem. 8 There has been much further work on the above ideas, particularly in the field of RE sets. The reader who wants an introduction to the latter subject cannot do better than consult Post's paper [9] ; it has been an inspiration to recursion theorists throughout the half century since it was written. §4. Degrees. We now come to a topic in recursion theory on which Kleene did little work; he wrote only one joint paper on the subject. However, because of the importance which the subject has achieved and the fundamental character of this paper, it is worth some discussion.
The concept is simple. If F and G are total 9 functions, let F ≤ G mean that F is recursive in G. The relation ≤ has some of the properties of a partial ordering; it is reflexive and transitive, but not symmetric. Researchers in partial orderings long ago told us what to do in such a case. We define
The equivalence class of F is called the degree of F , and is designated by dg F . We now define dg F ≤ dg G to mean that F ≤ G. The properties of ≤ mentioned above guarantee that this definition depends only on dg F and dg G, not on F and G, and that the resulting ≤ is a partial ordering of the degrees. 10 Every degree contains a relation; for F is equivalent to the graph of F , which is the set of all (n + 1)-tuples (x 1 , . . . , x n , F (x 1 , . . . , x n )). Since the contraction of F is equivalent to F , every degree contains a real and every degree contains a set.
What can we say about the partially ordered set of degrees? The class of recursive total functions is clearly a degree, which is the smallest degree; it is designated by 0. Every two element set (and hence every finite set) of degrees have a least upper bound; for the least upper bound of dg F and dg G is dg H , where
Many of the results of the early days of degree theory consisted of showing that this partially ordered set lacks other nice properties.
Post discovered all of this and some deeper results; but he did not publish them. Kleene heard of the results and wrote to Post, saying that he should certainly publish. Post compromised by writing out some things in a very disorganized form and suggesting that Kleene find a graduate student to work out the details. Kleene tried, but the graduate student was not successful; so Kleene (after making his own contribution by proving that two element sets need not have greatest lower bounds) completed the paper and published it as 1954.
The first important result of 1954 is that the partially ordered set of degrees is not linearly ordered. In terms of functions, this means that there are reals F and G such that neither is recursive in the other. We shall sketch the proof of this, since it is fundamental for all the degree theory which followed.
We want to ensure that F = {f} G and G = {f} F for all f (where {f} G is the analogue of {f} for recursion in G). We shall construct F and G in infinitely many steps, at each of which we define finitely many values of F and G. At the end of the fth step, we will have insured that F = {f} G and G = {f} F , and that F (f) and G(f) are defined. At the fth step, pick a number x such that F (x) is not yet defined. If there is no way to complete the definition of G so that {f} G (x) is defined, then we ensure F = {f} G by setting F (x) = 0. Suppose we can complete the definition of G so that {f} G (x) = y. It is easy to see from the definition of recursive in G that the truth of the equation {f} G (x) = y depends only on the values of G at finitely many arguments. Hence at step f, we may insure that {f} G (x) = y; and we may then insure that F = {f} G by defining F (x) = y + 1. By defining further values of F and G, we may also insure that G = {f} F and that F (f) and G(f) are defined.
Before publishing this paper, Kleene showed it to his graduate student Clifford Spector, who solved some of the problems which Kleene and Post left open. In particular, he proved in [12] that there were minimal degrees, i.e., degrees a > 0 such that there is no degree b with 0 < b < a. However, neither Kleene nor Spector did any further work in degrees.
We cannot even summarize all the work in degrees that has taken place since then; so we will only mention the most important single development. Call a degree RE if it contains a RE relation. The degree 0 ′ of a binary RE relation which enumerates all RE sets is easily seen to be the largest RE degree. Since there is an RE relation which is not recursive, 0 ′ = 0; so there are at least two RE degrees. Post had long been interested in the problem of whether there were additional RE degrees. It would certainly suffice to show that there are incomparable RE degrees; but the Kleene-Post proof will not do, since the F and G constructed there are not RE. For this, we should need the construction to be effective; but there is no effective way of deciding if we can complete the definition of G in the way required.
The additional idea needed to make the construction effective is the Priority Method, which was discovered independently by the undergraduate Friedberg 11 in the US and the undergraduate Muchnik in Russia not long after the publication of the Kleene-Post paper. (See [10] for references and for much else about priority.) In the forty years since then, this method has been intensively studied, but we are still very far from discovering all of its possibilities. §5. Real arguments and the analytical hierarchy. Suppose we take the functions we have been considering up to now and use them as arguments or values for new functions. How shall we extend recursion theory to this situation? Coding is of no use here; for the set of functions is uncountable and hence cannot be coded by numbers. Kleene gave much thought to this question from the time he returned from the war. When he had a satisfactory theory, and he and his graduate students had solved some of the resulting problems, he published his results in a series of three important papers (1955a, 1955b, 1955c) .
First, we have to decide which functions to allow as arguments and values. There is no need to consider functions as values; for if F takes functions as values, it may be replaced by the F ′ defined by F ′ (x, y) = (F (x))(y). We will allow only total functions as arguments. By replacing a total function by its contraction, we may assume that the arguments are reals.
We shall thus henceforth consider functions which take reals and numbers as arguments and numbers as values. We shall always put the real arguments first. A function is (m, n)-ary if it has m real arguments and n number arguments. We use α, and as variables for reals.
How can we extend computability to such functions? The problem here is: how are we to be given a real argument α of our function? The obvious answer is that we are given an object which, when presented with any given number x, will give us α(x). Following Turing, we call such an object an oracle for α.
It is easy to see that F is computable iff it has a computable associate. We therefore define an (m, n)-ary function to be recursive if it has a recursive associate. 12 Extending the results of §2 to our new functions is mostly an exercise in constructing associates. There are also a few new results; e.g., α(x) and α(x) are recursive functions of α and x. (On the other hand, α = is not a recursive function of α and .) As an index of a recursive F , we use any index of an associate of F . For m = 0, the Normal Form Theorem now has the form
We now let F (y) be the function obtained from F by substituting y for the first number argument to F . We then have the Recursion Theorem as before.
In III, we substituted a recursive function for a number argument of a recursive function G. We now do the same for real arguments. Of course, we cannot substitute H (. . . ) for α, since the former is a number and the latter is a real; so we need some new notation. If A is an expression containing x which designates a number, then xA designates the function whose value at any x is A. (This is the which gives the name to -definable functions.) Clearly xA is a unary function, which is a real iff A is defined for every value of x. The proof of the following consists of a straightforward construction of an associate for F .
Substitution Theorem. If G and H are recursive and H is total, then the
What about relativization to a class Φ of total functions? If the functions in Φ have real arguments, there are difficulties; this will be considered further in §7. If Φ is a class of functions of number variables, we may define relative recursiveness as before. However, there is in this case another simple definition: F is recursive in Φ iff there are G 1 , . . . , G j ∈ Φ and a recursive
for all α and x. Now let us turn to the generalization of the arithmetical hierarchy. Here, of course, we wish to allow both number quantifiers and real quantifiers. An analytical relation is one which has a definition consisting of number and real quantifiers followed by a recursive relation.
By a proof only slightly more complicated than the one we used in the arithmetical hierarchy, we show that every analytical relation has a definition in which the prefix does not have two successive quantifiers of the same kind, and there is exactly one number quantifier, which comes last. Then if the prefix has k real quantifiers and beings with ∃, the relation is Σ 
The general conclusion is: the definition may be chosen so that if α and y and the last two variables in the prefix, then they occur in the matrix only in the context α(y).
As before, we can show that every arithmetical relation is Π n for all n > k. We can also find closure properties similar to the arithmetical case. In particular, prefixing number quantifiers does not change the position of a relation in the analytical hierarchy. We can prove an Analytical Enumeration Theorem (again using the RE Enumeration Theorem) and use it to show that the hierarchy is nontrivial.
We shall establish a connection between Π Since O is a nondecreasing function of , we have From the Lemma, it is easy to show that if is recursive, then + 1 is recursive. It follows that every finite ordinal is recursive. A little more work shows that most of the countable ordinals which occur in practice (e.g., and 0 ) are recursive.
A sequence {x n } is O-descending if x n+1 ∈ W x n for all n. We show that x ∈ O iff there is no O-descending sequence beginning with x. If x ∈ O and {x n } is an O-descending sequence with x 0 = x, then x n+1 ∈ O and |x n+1 | < |x n | for all n by induction on n and the Lemma; and this is impossible. If x ∈ O, the Lemma shows that we can choose inductively a O-descending sequence {x n } such that x 0 = x and x n ∈ O for all n. Thus we have
We shall show that O is, in a certain sense, the most complicated Π 1 1 set. We say that a set A is many-one reducible to a set B if there is a recursive real F such that x ∈ A ↔ F (x) ∈ B for all x. This clearly implies that A is recursive in B.
Theorem. Every Π 
We complete the proof by showing that x ∈ A ↔ F (x, ) ∈ O. Suppose that x / ∈ A, and choose α so that ∀y¬R(x, α(y)). Then F (x, α(y)) is an RE-index of the set of F (x, α(y)ˆm), which contains F (x, α(y + 1)).
We will define α(n) by induction so that for all n,
Corollary. O is not Σ . This can be done for all relations; but, following Kleene, we shall consider only relations of number variables. In fact, we consider only sets, since n-ary relations can be replaced by their contractions.
We define the set H by induction on as follows: H (x) ↔ (∃ < )¬W x (H ) (where W x is the (1, 0)-ary relation with RE-index x). A set is hyperarithmetical 14 if it is many-one reducible to H for some recursive . We shall show that a set is ∆ 1 1 iff it is hyperarithmetical. We first obtain an inductive definition of H which uses notations instead of ordinals. Let f < O e mean that there is a sequence z 1 , . . . , z n with n > 1, z 1 = f, z n = e, and z i ∈ W z i+1 for 1 ≤ i < n. Writing this out (using a code of the sequence), we see that the relation < O is Σ 
Conversely, suppose that (4) and (5) hold. Using induction on |f| and (5), we get P (f) = H |f| for f ≤ O e. From this and (4), P = P e .
Let Q(α, e) be the conjunction of ∀f∀x(α( f, x ) = 0 → f ≤ O e) and , x ) )))).
By the RE Enumeration Theorem and the Substitution Theorem, Q is arithmetical. The above shows that for e ∈ O, Q(α, e) iff ∀f∀x(α( f, x ) = 0 ↔ P e (f, x)).
We can now prove that every hyperarithmetical set is ∆ 
We next show that there is a recursive real J such that x ∈ O * ↔ J (x) ∈ H for all . We assume that J is defined and prove the equivalence by induction on . It is enough to prove that x ∈ O ↔ ¬W J (x) (H ) for < . Now x ∈ O ↔ (∀y ∈ W x )(y ∈ O * ); so by the induction hypothesis, x ∈ O ↔ (∀y ∈ W x )(J (y) ∈ H ). Thus we have to show that W J (x) (H ) ↔ (∃y ∈ W x )(J (y) / ∈ H ). By the RE Enumeration Theorem, the right side is an RE relation of H , x, j where j is an index of J . If q is an RE-index of this relation, we want to have J (x) = S 2 (q, x, j). This can be achieved by the Recursion Theorem.
It follows that for recursive, O * is hyperarithmetical. Now if is recursive, so is +1, and O = O * +1 by (1) and (2). Hence O is hyperarithmetical.
If not, it follows from (1) that every recursive is < |x| for some x ∈ A. It follows by (2) that
)).
Hence O is Σ 
. By the Boundedness Theorem, there is a recursive such that B ⊂ O . It follows that x ∈ A ↔ F (x) ∈ O ; so A is many-one reducible to O . Since O is hyperarithmetical, A is hyperarithmetical. (This proof, which is different from Kleene's original proof, comes from the thesis of his student Spector [11] .)
One might hope to extend this result in the same way that the characterization of ∆ More information about the H is given by the next result.
Theorem. Let be a recursive ordinal, and let
Let e be a notation for . If J is as above, then < ↔ H (J (e)) for all by (2) 
. Hence = ↔ H +1 (J (e)) & ¬H (J (e)). From this and the definition of H , = ↔ ¬W J (e) (H ) & ¬H (J (e)).
There is an RE Q such that x ∈ A ↔ ¬Q(H , x). Then for > ,
(H ) ∨ H (J (e)) ∨ Q(H , x)).
Hence if q is an RE-index of the relation W J (e) (α) ∨ α(J (e)) = 0 ∨ Q(α, x) of α, x and F (x) = S(q, x), then x ∈ A ↔ F (x) ∈ H . In particular, it follows that if < , then H is many-one reducible to H . On the other hand, H is not recursive in H ; for if it were, then every set Π 0 1 in H would be recursive in H , which is false. Using the theorem and Post's Theorem, it is not difficult to show that a set is Π 0 n iff it is many-one reducible to H n . It follows that H is an example of a hyperarithmetical relation which is not arithmetical.
There has been considerably more study of the hyperarithmetical sets. In particular, Kleene 1959c showed that hyperarithmetical sets could be defined in other interesting ways.
In his thesis k in Φ can be given topological definitions. These concepts turn out to be identical with concepts studied in the 1920's by Lusin, Suslin, Sierpiński, and others. For example, the theorem that ∆ 1 1 in Φ is the same as hyperarithmetical in Φ is a famous theorem of Suslin; so the equivalence of ∆ 1 1 and hyperarithmetical is usually called the Suslin-Kleene Theorem. §6. Realizability. As Yiannis Moschovakis observed in a brief talk on Kleene's work at an ASL meeting, Kleene rarely worked on problems formulated by others. In particular, he did little on the application of recursion theory to other fields. By far his most important work on applications was in the field of intuitionism, where the problems to be solved were not clear before he entered the field. We shall give only a brief summary of the large amount of work he did in this field between 1940 and 1969, since there is an excellent survey of this work by Kleene 1973.
Kleene became interested in intuitionism by reading the works of Brouwer, Heyting, Gödel, Gentzen and others on the subject. His interest was a practical one; he felt that recursive functions must have a role in explaining the nature of a constructive proof, which is what intuitionism is all about. This consideration led him to the idea of realizability, which he developed in various forms over the years. The conclusions did not fulfill Kleene's greatest hope of giving a complete explanation of intuitionism in terms of recursive functions; but they did give many interesting results and much understanding.
Since Brouwer was quite prejudiced against formal systems, the formalization of intuitionism was left to his successors. By 1940, the formalization of the intuitionistic predicate calculus had been agreed upon. The notation is the same as the classical predicate calculus; but intuitionistically, none of the logical symbols ¬, ∨, & , →, ∀ and ∃ can be defined in terms of the others. The intuitionistically valid sentences are a proper subset of the classically valid sentences. An example of a classically valid but not intuitionistically valid sentence is A ∨ ¬A; this is intuitionistically true only if we have a constructive method of deciding which of A and ¬A is true.
Intuitionistic arithmetic is formed from the intuitionistic predicate calculus by adding the symbols 0 and Sc, the Peano axioms, and symbols for some basic functions together with the defining equations for these functions. (The exact choice of these functions is not too important. We shall suppose that they include the T n .) In arithmetic, we can eliminate ¬ by defining ¬A to mean A → 0 = 1.
One explanation of intuitionism is this: to say a mathematical statement A is true is to say that one has a construction which demonstrates A. Kleene's idea was to take e realizes A to mean that the number e codes a construction which demonstrates A. After some false starts, he arrived in 1945 at the following definition (by induction on the length of the sentence A of arithmetic): A is B → C , e realizes A if for each a, if a realizes B, then {e}(a) is defined and realizes C ; (e) If A is ∀xB(x), e realizes A if for each k, {e}(k) is defined and realizes A is ∃xB(x) , e realizes A if (e) 0 realizes B((e) 1 ).
B(k). (f) If
We then say that A is realizable if some e realizes A. Note that ¬A is realizable iff A is not realizable.
Kleene conjectured that if A was a theorem of intuitionistic arithmetic, then A was realizable. This conjecture was verified by Kleene's first Ph.D. student, David Nelson, in his thesis [6] .
One consequence of this result was that certain sentences which could be proved (nonconstructively) in classical arithmetic were not provable in intuitionistic arithmetic. For example, let A(x) be the formula ∃zT 1 (x, x, z). Then ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) is provable in the classical predicate calculus. Suppose that it is provable in intuitionistic number theory and hence realized by some e. Then for each x, {e}(x) is defined and realizes A(x) ∨ ¬A(x). It follows that A(x) is realizable iff ({e}(x)) 0 = 0. But A(x) is realizable iff T 1 (x, x, z) is realizable for some z; and T 1 (x, x, z) is realizable iff it is true. Thus ∃zT 1 (x, x, z) iff ({e}(x)) 0 = 0, and hence ∃zT 1 (x, x, z) is a recursive relation. Since ∃zT 1 (x, x, z) iff {x}(x) is defined, this contradicts the result at the end of §2. A consequence of this is that the classically false sentence ¬∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) is realizable.
Kleene saw that the usefulness of Nelson's result could be increased by modifying the notation of realizability by replacing e realizes A at some places by e realizes A and A is a theorem. (Specifically, replace (e) 1 The last of these results confirms a conjecture that Kleene made at the beginning of his consideration of intuitionism. Kleene later (in 1962a) noticed that (i) and (ii) could be proved by a much simpler definition of realizes which did not involve recursive functions at all.
Beginning about 1950, Kleene considered the same problems for second order number theory, or, as it is often called, analysis. This work, together with related work of his student Vesley, is contained in 1965.
To obtain intuitionistic analysis from intuitionistic arithmetic, we add real variables. (It is not necessary to add variables for n-ary functions, since the coding of finite sequences can be carried out in intuitionistic arithmetic.) This, of course, requires extending the intuitionistic predicate calculus to the new variables; but this is no problem. As further axioms, we first need for each numerical term t(x) an axiom saying there is one and only one real α such that α(x) = t(x) for all x. There is a weak form of the axiom of choice expressible in this notation which is intuitionistically valid. We take as an axiom Brouwer's bar theorem, which says that certain types of transfinite induction are allowed.
The last axiom, which Kleene calls Brouwer's principle, is a strong form of the statement: if to each α a number y(α) is assigned, then for each α the value of y(α) depends only on a finite number of values of α. This is intuitionistically valid because y(α) must be obtained constructively from an oracle for α; so we can only consult the oracle finitely often. Unlike the other axioms, it is not classically valid, as we see by taking y(α) = 0 if ∀x(α(x) = 0) and y(α) = 1 otherwise.
The extension of realizability from arithmetic to analysis presents considerable difficulty. In arithmetic, we consider only sentences; formulas with free variables were treated by replacing each free variable by a name of a number. This does not work in analysis, since we do not have names for all reals. Thus we must now define realizability for a pair (A, Φ), where Φ is a function which assigns a meaning to each variable free in A. Now the meaning of a real variable may well be a nonrecursive real; so we can expect the construction for (A, Φ) to have some nonconstructive elements. This is best handled by allowing (A, Φ) to be realized by a real instead of a number.
We are thus led to define Φ-realizes A for a real and A a formula of analysis. The definition is virtually a copy of the definition for arithmetic. We take ( ) i to be the real defined by ( ) i (x) = ( (x)) i . The explanation of { }(α) (which occurs in the definition of realizes A → B and realizes ∀αA(α)) is that { }(α) = F (α) where is an associate of F .
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With this definition, it is fairly straightforward to show that every theorem of intuitionistic analysis is realizable. One consequence is that intuitionistic analysis is seen classically to be consistent; this is not trivial, since intuitionistic analysis is not a subsystem of classical analysis. As in arithmetic, realizability could be used to show that certain classically provable results were not intuitionistically provable. Other interesting independence results could be obtained by restricting in some way the class of reals allowed to realize a formula. For example, one can show that the bar theorem is not provable from the remaining axioms. (This has some interest, since Brouwer gave various proofs of the bar theorem from results he thought to be simpler.)
Extending (i)-(iii) to analysis proved to be quite difficult. Kleene's student Joan Rand Moschovakis [5] was able to extend (i) and (ii), but only at the cost of replacing Brouwer's principle by a weaker axiom. Kleene finally found a proof of (i)-(iii) in 1969. It required carrying out the definition of realizability within the language of analysis. This completed Kleene's work on realizability; but it has since been used by several investigators, usually to prove independence results. §7. Objects of higher types. In §5, we added some of the functions of our theory as new arguments, thus obtaining new functions. This process can be repeated once more, or even infinitely many times. Kleene began thinking about the resulting theory about 1952. The principal results appeared in a two part paper (1959a, 1963) which contains some of Kleene's most profound work.
We first define the objects of type t by induction on t. An object of type 0 is a number; an object of type t + 1 is a mapping of the set of objects of type t into the set of numbers. Thus an object of type 1 is just a real. We use α t , t , and t as variables for objects of type t; we omit the superscript whenever possible.
The functions we now consider will have n arguments, each of a specified type, and will have numbers as values. In describing computability of such functions, a new problem arises. Again we are given an argument α t+1 by being given an oracle which, presented with a t , will give us the value α( ). The trouble is that the object may be highly noncomputable; so we will have introduced noncomputable information into our computation.
One solution is to require the oracle to give the value α( ) after having been presented with only finitely many values of . This means that the α must be of a special kind; its value at any is determined by only finitely many values of . The recursion theory of these objects was developed by Kreisel and Davis (independently), and Kleene eventually took up the question in 1959b. As Kleene showed, this theory reduces to the theory in §5.
(For references and more information about this recursion theory, see [7] .) Kleene was, however, interested in a theory which would really use the objects of higher type. His idea was that an oracle for α would give the value of α( ) if it were presented with an algorithms for computing . (The algorithm could use any oracles which we already had on hand, including an oracle for α.) This idea could be mixed with any of the definitions of recursive we have mentioned (although in each case there are some complications). Kleene obtained his first results by using -definability; but then he saw how to generalize recursively closed sets. He eventually published papers (1962b, 1962c, 1962d, 1962e) showing that all these approaches were equivalent.
We are going to modify I-V to fit the present situation. We add to I three functions Pr, DC, and Ap defined by
II and III remain the same, except that the variables may be of any types. For reasons we shall explain shortly, we omit the old IV and V. Our new IV corresponds to asking the oracle for an object of type ≥ 2 for a value of the object. (Oracles for reals are taken care of by the function Ap.) IV. If G is recursive and F is defined by
We assign indices to all these functions much as before. In particular, if F and G are as in IV and g is an index of G, then 4, g is an index of F . We again want to have the Enumeration Theorem: {f}( α) is a recursive function of f, α. Our new V says that this function is recursive for each choice of the types of the α i .
V
To the F of V we assign the index 5, t 1 , . . . , t n , where t i is the type of α i . Note that in V, F is defined in terms of all recursive functions together with their indices. Hence it is impossible to define the recursive functions by I-V as before. Instead, we will define the true formulas to be the theorems of a formal system, and then use this to define the recursive functions and their indices.
A formula is now an equation {f}( α) = y, where f is an index of a function and the types of α i are such that α is an appropriate argument for {f}. The formal system is very much like the formal system in §2; so we shall give only the rule of inference corresponding to IV. It says that { 4, g }(α t+2 , ) = α( ) is inferable from the set of formulas {g}(α, , ) = ( ) for an object of type t. Since this rule has infinitely many hypotheses, we can no longer define proofs as before. Instead, we define a class T of formulas for each ordinal by induction on as follows: a formula is in T if it is inferable from formulas in < T . Note that T is a non-decreasing function of . A formula is a theorem if it belongs to T for some .
A class T of formulas is regular if for each f and α, there is at most one y such that {f}( α) = y is in T . We show that the class of theorems is regular. It will clearly suffice to prove that for each , T is regular; and we do this by induction on . We suppose f = 4, g ; the proof is much the same for other values of f. Suppose that {f}(α, ) = y and {f}(α, ) = y ′ are in T . Then there are and ′ such that y = α( ), y ′ = α( ′ ), and for each , {g}(α, , ) = ( ) and {g}(α, , ) = ′ ( ) are in < T . By the induction hypothesis, ( ) = ′ ( ) for all ; so = ′ ; so y = y ′ . We let {f}( α) be the unique number y such that {f}( α) = y is a theorem; if no such y exists, {f}( α) is undefined. Then {f}( α) = y is true iff it is a theorem. We say that f is an index of F if F ( α) = {f}( α) for all α, and define a function to be recursive if it has an index. It is then clear that each of I-V is correct, and that the functions defined by I-V have the indices we have indicated.
If {f}( α) = y is a true formula, the ordinal of {f}( α) = y is the least such that {f}( α) = y is in T . Since y is uniquely determined by f and α, we also call the ordinal of {f}( α); so {f}( α) has an ordinal iff it is defined. If {f}( α) = y has ordinal , then it is inferable from a subclass A of < T ; and an examination of the rules of inference shows that A is uniquely determined. The members of A are called the predecessors of {f}( α) = y, and the left sides of the members of A are called the predecessors of {f}( α). These predecessors then have ordinals < ; this is useful in giving proofs by induction on .
The Enumeration Theorem is a consequence of our definition. Since we can define the S function much as before, we can prove the Recursion Theorem. This can be used to show that the old IV and V (extended to allow higher type arguments) hold in the present theory. The proof of IV is much like the application of Recursion Theorem to definitions by induction given in §2. (It is here that we need the functions Pr and DC.) To treat V, we use the Recursion Theorem to define a function H such that H (y, α) = 0 if G(y, α) = 0 and H (y, α) = Sc(H (Sc(y), α) ) if G(y, α) > 0. We leave it to the reader to show that y(G(y, α) = 0) = H (0, α). We can then develop the basic theory as in §2; but there is no Normal Form Theorem. Observe also that α t+1 ( t ) is a recursive function of α and ; this is easily proven by induction on t, using IV.
We would, of course, like to show that for arguments of type 0 and 1, the recursive functions given by the definition of this section are the same as those defined in §2 and §5. We shall consider only functions with arguments of type 0; when these are taken care of, the rest is simple. The above shows that the recursive functions of arguments of type 0 form a recursively closed class, and therefore include the recursive functions of §2. For the converse, one notes that when dealing only with functions of type 0 arguments, one can prove a Normal Form Theorem almost exactly as before. Of course, the T n and U are different from the T n and U in §2; but they are defined similarly and hence are recursive in the sense of §2. But then the Normal Form Theorem shows that every function of type 0 variables which is recursive in the present sense is recursive in the sense of §2.
The Substitution Theorem as stated in §5 does not hold here, as the following example shows. Let A be a Π 0 1 set which is not Σ 0 1 ; say x ∈ A ↔ ∀yR(x, y) with R recursive. Let K(x, y) = zR(x, y), so that K(x, y) = 0 if R(x, y) and K(x, y) is undefined otherwise. Then K is recursive and yK(x, y) is a real iff x ∈ A. Define recursive G and H by G(α (2) , x) = α ( yK(x, y) ), H (x,
(1) ) = 0, and let F (x) = G( H (x, ), x). Then F (x) is defined iff x ∈ A. Since the domain of F is not RE, F is not recursive. There are various assumptions on G and H which make the Substitution Theorem true; the simplest is that G is total.
Substitution Theorem. If G and H are recursive and total, and F is defined by
The Substitution Theorem is a consequence of the following.
Lemma. For each t ≥ 1, there is a recursive total function Z t such that
The proof is by induction on t. We let i = n, i 1 , . . . , i p and write for {h}( α, ). We assume that Z t is defined and prove α) ) by induction on the ordinal of {f}( i ( , α)), dividing into cases according to the nature of the index f. In each case, we find that Z t must satisfy an equality whose left side is Z t (f, h, i), and whose right side may contain Z t or an index of Z t . We can then find a recursive Z t which satisfies the equalities by the Recursion Theorem; and it will be total.
We shall examine one important case. Suppose f = 4, g and i 1 = 1. Then
where j is a recursive function of i. Using II, we can find a recursive function α, ) ) is a predecessor of {f}( i ( , α) ), the induction hypothesis shows that {g}( j ( , α, )) = {Z t (g, h ′ , j)}( α, ), and hence
Since is of type t, is of type t − 2. Hence by the induction hypothesis on t,
where k is a recursive function of i. Thus we want
. By induction on t, we define a mapping up of the set of type t objects into the set of type t + 1 objects and a mapping do of the set of type t + 1 objects into the set of type t objects such that do(up(α)) = α for all α (and hence up is one-one and do is onto). For t = 0, we let up(x) = yx and do(α) = α(0). We can use this coding of finite sequences to define the contraction of a total function F as before. If the arguments of F have types t 1 , . . . , t n , then F is an object of type 1 + max t i ; and F is recursive iff F is recursive. We can then define relative recursion by using the alternate definition of §5: F is recursive in Φ if there are G 1 , . . . , G n ∈ Φ and a recursive F ′ such that
for all α. Now let us turn to extensions of the analytical hierarchy. For r ≥ 1, a relation is of order r + 1 if it has a definition consisting of quantifiers of type ≤ r followed by a recursive relation. Much as before, we can suppose that in the prefix no two successive quantifiers are of the same kind, and that all of the quantifiers are of type r except the last, which is of type r − 1. If the prefix has k quantifiers of type r and the first is existential { universal }, the relation is Σ We again define a relation to be RE if it is the domain of a recursive function. Again Σ 0 1 relations are RE; but the converse is no longer true. The best we can prove is the following.
Theorem. Let r ≥ 1, and let R be an RE relation having arguments of type ≤ r + 1. Then R is Π Now we outline the proof of the theorem. (We have incorporated some simplifications of Kleene's proof due to Platek [8] .) Fix r, and let α be a sequence of objects having types ≤ r + 1. An α-formula is a formula {f}( ) = y where every object in is either in α or of type < r. Of course, {f}( α) = y is an α-formula; and it is easy to see that every predecessor of a true α-formula is an α-formula. We can code the α-formulas by type r − 1 objects as follows. Let α be α 0 , . . . , α n−1 . If i is α j , i is j; if i is a number z, i = n + z; otherwise, i = i . Then the code of {f}( α) = y is f, , y . Let Tr( α, ) mean that is the code of a true α-formula. We shall prove that Tr is Π Then is of type r and of type r − 1; so we may quantify over but not over . This is all right, because regularity tells us that = y( (. . . ) = 0) where . . . is the code of {g}(α i , , ) = y.
A class A of α-formulas is α-closed if it is regular and every α-formula inferable from formulas in A is in A. The class of true α-formulas is clearly α-closed. Moreover, it is the smallest α-closed class. To see this, we must show that if A is α-closed, then every true α-formula a is in A; and we do this by induction on the ordinal of a. The predecessors of a are true α-formulas and hence in A; so a ∈ A because A is α-closed.
Let Cl( α, r ) mean that is the set of codes of an α-closed class. Since Inf is of order r, Cl is of order r. By the above paragraph,
Hence Tr is Π r 1 . It remains to show that Tr is Σ r 1 if r > 1. We recall that if R is a binary relation on a class A, then R well-founds A if there is no sequence {a n } in A which is R-descending, i.e., such that R(a n+1 , a n ) for all n. Suppose that a is a true α-formula; A is the regular class of true α-formulas; and R(b, c) iff b, c ∈ A and the ordinal of b is less than the ordinal of c. Then: (i) a ∈ A; (ii) R well-founds A; (iii) for all b ∈ A, b is inferable from formulas in {c : R(c, b) }. Conversely, if a is an α-formula, A a regular class of α-formulas, R a binary relation on A and (i)-(iii) hold, then a is true; for otherwise, we can use (i) and (iii) to construct an R-descending sequence of false formulas in A, contradicting (ii).
It follows that if A varies through sets of type r − 1 objects and R through binary relations on type r − 1 objects,
Thus it suffices to show that 'R well-founds A' is a relation of A and R of order r when r > 1. For of type r − 1, define [ ] i = r−2 ( i, ). Then for each infinite sequence { i } of type r − 1 objects, there is a such that
A particularly interesting type 2 object is the object E defined by E(α) = 0 if ∃x(α(x) = 0), E(α) = 1 otherwise. We can reasonably identify this object with the existential number quantifier. It is easy to see that every arithmetical relation is recursive in E. More generally:
Theorem. A set is recursive in E iff it is hyperarithmetical.
First, every set which is RE in E is Π 1 1 . The proof of this is practically the same as the above proof with r = 1, α = E. The only place where the definition of E is pertinent is in the proof that Inf is of order r,i.e., arithmetical. This is all right, since, E(α) = y is clearly arithmetical.
If A is recursive in E, then A and ¬A are RE in E and hence Π 1 1 ; so A is ∆ 1 1 and hence hyperarithmetical. To prove the converse, it sufficed to show that each H is recursive in E. For this, we define a recursive G so that if e ∈ O, H |e| = xG (E, e, x) . Assume that G is defined, and let us prove this by induction on |e|. By (3) of §5 and the induction hypothesis,
where g is an index of G. The right side is arithmetical and hence is a recursive relation R of g, E, e, x. Thus we need to have G(α 2 , e, x) = R(g, α, e, x), which we can accomplish by the Recursion Theorem.
A great deal of work in recursion in higher types has been done since the basic papers; but we shall only mention one point which continued to interest Kleene. This was the failure of the Substitution Theorem (in the strong form of §5). It is clear that the difficulty is that the right side of the equation is necessarily undefined if H ( α, ) is not total. Thus Kleene suggested in 1963 that one should allow objects to be partial. An object of type t + 1 is to be a partial mapping of the set of objects of type t into the set of numbers. However, if t = 0, we do not take all such mappings. We require that if α t+1 ( ) = x, and ′ is an extension of , then α( ′ ) = x. These objects are called monotone objects.
The first person to develop recursion theory using monotone objects was Platek in his thesis [8] . He also used another idea first suggested in 1963; instead of building the Enumeration Theorem into the definition, he built in the First Recursion Theorem, which is a form of the Recursion Theorem which does not involve indices. 16 This means that the recursive functions could be introduced directly by the schemes as in §2, instead of the indirect method used here. Platek actually used a great many more types (e.g., types of n-ary functions) so that there was no longer any difference between objects and functions. The result was an extremely elegant definition of the class of recursive functions. More or less the same theory, formulated more along the lines of Kleene, was discovered by Kleene's student Kierstead [4] .
Kleene felt that the proper way to select the objects was by consideration of how an oracle for the object should behave. To him, this justified monotoneness; for if the oracle for α decides that α( ) = x from being given information about , and later new information about is discovered, then the oracle should not change her decision. (Oracles do not make mistakes!) In a series of papers 17 (1978, 1980, 1982, 1984) , Kleene considered more closely how oracles behave and arrived at the more restrictive class of unimonotone objects. Perhaps because Kleene never got around to developing the recursion theory of these objects, it is not clear that the much more complicated unimonotone objects have any advantage over the monotone objects. §8. Miscellaneous. There are two other articles of Kleene which deserve at least a brief discussion here. In 1952a, he considers a problem from logic: when is a first order theory finitely axiomatizable? (We assume that all first order theories have only finitely many nonlogical constants.) This problem has inspired a lot of work by model theorists, without receiving a fully satisfactory answer.
Kleene considered a modified problem: when is a theory finitely axiomatizable using additional constants? In other words, when does a theory T have a finitely axiomatizable extension T ′ such that a sentence in the language of T is provable in T ′ iff it is provable in T ? We assume that the formulas of each theory have been assigned codes in a reasonable way. We may then apply concepts of recursion theory by replacing expressions by their codes. Now if T and T ′ are as above, then the set of theorems of T ′ is RE; the proof is just like the proof in §3 that the set of codes of true formulas is RE. It follows that the set of theorems of T is RE. Kleene proved that this necessary condition for finite axiomatizability using additional constants is also sufficient.
Suppose that the set of theorems of T is an RE set A. We can construct a finitely axiomatized subsystem S of arithmetic with a formula φ(x) such that for each number k, φ(k) is provable in S iff k ∈ A. (This construction essentially goes back to Church in his proof of the nonexistence of algorithm result mentioned in §1.) We get T ′ from S by introducing the symbols of T and the unary predicate symbol N ; the axiom φ(x) → N (x); and a finite number of axioms which insure that if k is the code of a sentence , then ↔ N (k) is a theorem. It is then clear that every theorem of T is a theorem of T ′ . Now suppose that is a sentence in T which is a theorem of T ′ . If is not a theorem of T , we can find a model of T having the set of numbers as its universe in which is false. It will be enough to extend this to a model of T ′ . The symbols of S have obvious meanings which makes the axioms of S true. The meaning of N is chosen to make the axioms used to prove ↔ N (k) true. The axiom φ(k) → N (k) is true because if φ(k) is true, then k is the code of a theorem of T , and hence and ↔ N (k) are true in the model.
At the time, Kleene was much interested in intuitionism; so he wanted to show that his result held also in intuitionistic systems. Here we have no completeness theorem; so the last part of the proof must show directly how to convert a proof of in T ′ into a proof in T . This can be done by using Gentzen proof theory; but it requires supplementing Gentzen's Haupsatz by a result saying that we can always use Gentzen's rules in a certain order. The proof of this result (which is of general interest in proof theory) is the other paper in 1952a.
In the summer of 1951, Kleene went to work at RAND. At someone's suggestion, he read an article by McCulloch and Pitts, who were trying to build a model of neural activity based on a simple kind of machine. Kleene abstracted from their ideas the notion of a finite automaton, and proceeded to describe exactly what sets were defined by such automata.
Let Ω be a finite set of symbols. An Ω-word is a finite sequence of symbols in Ω. A finite automaton over Ω consists of the following things: (a) a finite set S of states; (b) a 0 in S, called the initial state; (c) a mapping T of S × Ω into S, called the transition function; (d) a subset S 0 of S, called the set of designated states. We start the automaton by putting the machine in its initial state and putting a tape containing an Ω-word into the machine with its first symbol scanned. If at any time, the machine is in state and is scanning the symbol a, then it passes to the state T ( , a) and scans the next symbol if there is one; if the scanned symbol is the last symbol of the Ω-word, the machine stops. The machine accepts the Ω-word if it is in a designated state when it stops.
If A and B are Ω-words, A · B = {ab : a ∈ A & b ∈ B}. We define A n inductively by A 0 = {∅} (where ∅ is the empty Ω-word), A n+1 = A n · A. Let A * = n A n . Let R be the smallest class of sets of Ω-words such that: (i) the empty set is in R; (ii) {∅} is in R; (iii) if a is a symbol, then {a} is in R; (iv) if A and B are in R, then A ∪ B and A · B are in R; (v) if A is in R, then A * is in R. Kleene's main result was that a set of Ω-words is the set accepted by a finite automaton iff it is in R.
After writing up this proof in 1956a, Kleene gave no more attention to finite automaton. However, his theorem has proved fundamental in all further research in the subject.
Besides research, Kleene did a great deal of expository writing, some of it aimed at nonlogicians or even nonmathematicians. His writing is not notable for elegance or conciseness; but it is always clear and precise, and tells the readers what he really needs to know. His most important expository work is 1952b, which, as we have indicated, is also an important research work. It arrived too late for my education; I learned most of my basic logic from the original paper-covered edition of Church's Introduction to Mathematical Logic, which I still consider one of the gems of the literature of logic. However, the logicians who followed me usually learned their logic from 1952b. Gerald Sacks and Michael Morley (among others) have said they read the book word by word during their graduate careers. In looking back at 1952b in preparation for writing this article, I was surprised how much of it seems pertinent today.
Kleene was not what one would call a brilliant teacher; but he worked hard at teaching and always did a good job. His list of Ph.D. students cannot match those of Church, Tarski, or Sacks; but it is quite respectable nevertheless. Although he would never consider writing a thesis for a student, he was willing to spend large amounts of time in encouraging and advising his students. It seems fair to say that each of them wrote the best thesis of which he was capable.
Kleene was a great supporter of the ASL, and served a term as its president. He almost single-handedly ran the research section of the JSL for many years (while Church ran the reviews).
Of course, mathematics was the central interest of Kleene's professional life; but he had many other interests. I recall him taking part in noncurricular activities at meetings, from the swimming at the July 4th picnic at the 1957 Cornell meeting to rock climbing at the Kleene Symposium in Madison in 1978 .
Kleene was, of course, respected by several generations of logicians; but most of them also looked on him as a friend. He always treated the logicians he met well, irrespective of their abilities or reputations. I first met him in 1956 18 , when I was a NSF Postgraduate Fellow at the Institute with very little published; he treated me as kindly then as in our meetings in later years, when I was better known in logical circles.
Stephen Cole Kleene died in Madison, Wisconsin on January 25, 1994.
